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LESSONS LEARNED
AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL ISSUES
The knowledge we use today iscontained in an untoldnumber of technicaland
managerialhandbooks. This knowledge isderived from the known strengthsand
weaknesses experiencedduring the execution of programs and projectsthatare being
used today. Tomorrow's handbooks willdefine many additionalessonsthat designers,
testoperators,management, and operationalpersonnelwillapplyon such programs as
the National AeroSpace Plane (NASP), the Space StationFreedom (SSF),and future
launch vehicles.Before placingspecificlessonslearnedand culturalissuesbefore you, I
believea few introductoryremarks are appropriateso thatwe allstartoff from a
common referencepoint.Let us begin with a few well-known and generallyaccepted
concepts: (Not everyonewillagree or be happy withtheset)
_d! What this indicates is our inability to present them in an
appropriate way or .....
_i!i__di+O_d_i_i_:!:$___ That is,ifyou are under 40, itis
difficultto believethatthose over 40 have been throughwhat "YOU" are
going through;whereas those over 40 finditdifficultto believethateveryone
elsemay not alreadyknow of theirweaknesses and more importantlyof their
successes!Lessons learned are in effectthe history,the evolutionof
technical,scientific,and managerial advancement.
__i:'_:f:_i_:_"__i:___ In the aftermath of the
Apollo Command Module Spacecraftfireof January 1967,the Congress of
the United States,along with NASA, took a number of stepsto resolvethe
many issuesraisedby thataccident. One such stepwas the creationof the
Aerospace SafetyAdvisory Panel (ASAP) by Congress. The Panel ischarged
with reviewingand assessingallNASA programs and projectswith an
emphasis on safety,reliability,and qualityassurance.An excellent
explanationof thiswas given by Alan LovelaceActing NASA Administrator
in May 1978:
"Where do the Panel's interests lie? A safety review usually tends to
concentrateon the engineeringdesign and qualitycontrolaspectsof safety.
While theseare important factors,they do not representthe totalnecessary
for safeand reliableprograms. Just as importantare the manufacturing
practices,organizationalstructure,and human attitudes.Management
approaches-and particularlymanagement's abilityto balance schedule,cost,
design,development,and testing--oftenare the most importantfactorsin the
totalsuccessand safetyof a program."
It is easy to see that the genesis of many of the design, test, operational, and
management tools are derived from near-misses as well as tragedies.
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Although it may be somewhat difficult to separate program development and
cultural issues, it is worthwhile to at least think of mere separately in the beginning to
understand their synergism in the end. First, let us consider cultural issues as they affect
the thinking and actions of technical management and engineering.
Just as the American public was awed by the early flights made by the Wright
Brothers in the first decade of the 20th century, they exhibited the same degree of
amazement at the Russian's launching and orbiting the first Sputnik in October 1957.
With the passage of time, the public takes for granted the continuation of these truly
fantastic steps in the aerospace sciences and their implementation and application to our
daily fives. Translmssion of live real-time "IV pictures are accepted; and if you ask one
thousand viewers how it is accomplished, the answer is "I really am not sure, but it is
there!" Airline transportation is accepted in the same way, and few people can
remember taking a prop-driven plane from New York to Los Angeles or to London and
a!.!...t.hat.!t...e.ntailed. NO.W..apply t!_is to cuffe.nt _d..P!;oje_ed aerospace..pr.o_a_ where.
spm_tts _:e -_un'................._":::"_................:_:'::":::i::::d:•'_: !: _u_:'...............What does thislead to?
• . Horror When the Challenger ac_dent occuffed and a sweeping indictment
agai_t management and technical capability,
• How can we spend billions to put men and experiments in space when
-people are hungry and homeless here on earth7
• Additional oversight by.outside agencies, including the Congress. What
about Senator Gore's reasonable statement that "only through an annual
authorization can Congress play a-continuous oversight role effectively."
The continuing argument over the appropriate mix of manned versus
unmanned, reusable Shuttle versus Expendable Launch Vehicles, and
government versus civilian space roles.
All of these affect the environment within which the current and future
aeronautical and space ventures will have to operate. These affect resource availability
to conduct every facet of the program and leads to another problem that has become a
part of our fives.
__:::___:_ii_/._i_i!__] The impact of propulsion
system effluents are emerging as a major determinant in the selection of propellants.
Solid rocket motors are now viewed vdth some apprehension _cause of the acids and
chlorine derivatives that are discharged from launch point to stratospheric altitudes as
well as the other particulates. Cleaner burning propellants and oxidizers are being
developed, and the use of hybrid rockets as well as more extensive use of l/quid rockets
are in the offering. Even the burning of waste propellants is now a controlled activity.
The use of hydrazines and other sophisticated but toxic propulsion systems require
additional care and feeding. In the coming years, the "environmental movement" will be
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having an ever greater impact. The public's view of the world and man's affecting it is
not confined to the United States, but is a world-wide concern.
In a totally different arena, look at the difference between the early spacecraft
put into orbit by the United States and the USSR. The Apollo-Soy_z combined
Russian-American missions conducted in the period July 15-24, 1975, showed some
distinct differences:
The androgynous USSR docking system versus the Apollo probe and drogue
system;
• The use of solar panels rather than fuel cells;
• The use of 14.7-psia atmosphere versus 5-psia oxygen rich, and so on.
In effect, our spacecraft were somewhat more sophisticated and even, to a degree,
chrome plated. Today, the Russian and American space vehicles are tending toward a
more center-of-the-road in "chrome-_lating." None-the-less, both of them..d.o _,e job.
CULTURAL HISTORY SHOWS---
MORE_ l
"AI"rENTIONTO I _ _
WHATEXPERIENCEI / \ / \ / \
, / \ / \ / \
TELLS US"
"n_UMATI L_E_I'8
APOLLO204 APOLLO 13 8KYLAB CHALLENGER
FIRE
LESS I
"THE OLD DAYS" "NOW" "FUTURE"
TIME/HISTORY
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"POINT THREE
Some typical lessons learned that deal with the four areas of interest:
Requirements
Technology/Performance/Operations
Reliability/Safety
Procurement/Contracting
are given here. They are, of course, only representative of so many others that each and
everyone involved in aerospace design, development, test, and operations has perhaps
experienced.
Requirements come in many forms; for our purposes we will use a broad brush
and look at technical specifications as well as technical management requirements at the
start of a program. The reason.'? A lesson learned is: The future of a program is
determined to a great extent by how it is started.
. Initial system definition either was not accomplished by an orderly anal_is
process or effort, and was incomplete and inadequate. There were no
continuing requirements to perform system analysis on selective basis during
the acquisition phase. Critical evaluations should be made by the
government and contractors in the early design stages concerning the
specification requirements. They should be evaluated from both viewpoints-
too tight, too loose. ("A Summary of Lessons Learned from Air Force
Management Surveys," 1 June 1963).
. Technical and management requirements must take into account the
"Resource Conservation and Recovery Act" (RCRA was established in 1976
with amendments added in the 1980s). The development of advanced
weapons systems and new aerospace technologies will be accompanied by
new fuels, hybrid structural materials, and other unique chemicals as well as
new processes, many of which have the potential for creating unacceptable
health hazards. This continuous influx of new and exotic materials from the
research, development, and acquisition pipeline brings attention to the first
point in the process at which decisions need to be made to procure or not
procure a specific material. (JANNAF Safety and Environmental Protection
Subcommittee Workshop, 3 April 1989).
,t From a "Report_ to the Committee on Science and Technology, House of
Representatives On Centaur Cost, Schedule and Performance Review," 1986:
The most significant reason for the problems experienced in the Centaur/Shuttle
integration process was that, while we have two centers with considerable space flight
experience, the prime center responsible for development of the Centaur had previously
been involved in unmanned vehicle systems and now was responsible for providing
complex vehicle systems that would fly within a manned vehicle. $|_fi_
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f_q___iii_di::_ lhe level of fault tolerance, fault molatmn and system design,
including increased redundancy, are considerably greater for manned missions.
More critically, the planning and design requirements associated with the Shuttle off-
nominal and abort modes were not properly assessed at the start of the program.
Program requirements that should have been designed into the vehicle system to prevent
loss of life or loss of an Orbiter were developed after the flight hardware design was
well under way.
Lessons Learned included:
safeWi!i:$_uld:ia_ _e_p__ Some of the other lessons learned items mentioned
m this report are also a significant contributor to the safety process problem, i.e., getting
all organizations involved in the program design process very_ earlyso that their
requirements can be irtcorporated in the most effective manner. •More manpower and
resources should be allottedto cdmplex, first-time payloads, posing Uniquesafety
hazards to the NSTS and"crew early enough to support major. program milestones such
_.s a critical design review and phase II safety review. "
Although. propulsion systems and their components az.e .but one of a number of
independent yet integrated, members of a complete aerospace flight vehicle, __6fi
_":::::!:i:_i_:?i:.i't!:!:::::.?? =============================================================::::..:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
Typical propulsion interests are centered upon such items as:
Solid Rockets - Propellant integrity, ignitor reliability, nozzle durability, safe
handling, reuse, safe/arm systems, case insulation, ballistics.
Liquid Rockets - Turbomachinery design and certification, red-lines for test
and flight, leakage, sensors, reuse, engine controllers.
• Hybrids - all of the above
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Auxiliary Power Units - Reliability, maintainability, speed control, heat
dissipation, restart, leakage.
Typical lessons learned are as follows:
Figure 1 shows a "straight forward" design change made to the SSME High
Pressure Fuel Turbopump that was the cause of SSME Engine #2013 to fail and caused
the loss of the engine. This occurred April 7, 1982. It is only a small pan of the whole
pump assembly, but the change to the "Kaiser Hat" nut assembly configuration was
pinpointed as the cause of the failure.
2. Figure 2 shows the culprit in the April 1980, spacesuit backpack fire.
Ignition took place in a V-shaped passage that served to restrict the flow of oxygen
between a shut-off valve and a chamber in the backpack's high pressure regulator
module. The failure resulted in autoignition of the metal at the end of the drilled
passage due to compression and/or shock heating of the high pressure gaseous oxygen.
3. Figure 3 indicates the erosion concerns on the solid rocket motor composite
nozzle in the early days of Shuttle missions. The degree of char or erosion was
ascertained to be greatly dependent upon composite ply angle, nozzle manufacturing
process temperature-time-pressure parameters, material controls for volatiles, and ash.
The current nozzle has predictable final characteristics and is performing as specified.
4. To meet the needs of designers, the NASA Chief Engineer's office initiated
a series of "Experienced Bulletins" providing design and operational lessons learned. An
example of this, shown in Figure 4, deals with a rocket motor case problem occurring on
a scout launch vehicle.
5. The point of view that the SEASAT spacecraft Agena "bus" (launched in
1978) used flight proven equipment that was also standard on other spacecraft and did
not need tender loving care had far reaching consequences. The SEASAT Failure
Review Board noted: "It became program policy to minimize testing and
documentation, to qualify components by similarity wherever possible, and to minimize
the penetration into the Agena spacecraft or "bus, by the government. It led to a
concentration by project management on the sensors (experiments), sensor integration,
and the data management system to the near exclusion of the "bus" subsystems.
Important component failures were not reported to project management, a test was
waived without proper approval, and compliance with specifications was weak." The
component that failed-the slip ring assembly-was never mentioned in the briefing
charts. The power subsystem design had the adjacent brush assemblies of opposite
electrical polarity_. This wiring arrangement, together with the congested nature of the
design itself, made the slip ring assembly actually unique and very prone to shorting-
which it did.
6. Just a very brief word on ground facilities. The KSC "uninterruptable power
supply" system has been interrupted several times during the past 10 years. There would
appear to be some difference between system names and system performance.
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Reliability/Safety
In a memo from the astronaut senior member discussing the proper perspective
to put on corrections to eliminate or reduce possible failure modes we have this:
.._every f_ _ som_ _,e_o_ _meo_ii_i_i:__ii_
_6_ These solutions come in the form of hardware and software changes,
complication of ground and flight procedures, new or modified facilities,
manufacturing and inspection requirements. The proven costs of such solutions
are money, schedule delays, and additional unknowns. I believe that many of our
solutions to problems create more serious problems through added complication,
dilution of effort, and increased time compression on already over-stressed work
loads. There is an infinite supply of possible failures to support these hypotheses,
as evidenced by continual and sometimes increasing hardware and software
change board traffic. Unless management and program personnel develop a
sense of proportion, we will forever be trying to chase things to the last decimal
point, frittering away limited resources on insignificant issues."
• It is for this reason that the Aerospace Safety AdvisoryPanel is strongly.
supportive of the framework for risk. assessment described in NASA"s Management
•Instruction NMI.8070.4, "Risk Manegement Policy for Mannec!Flight Programs." I.
•might add that much of this NMI would cet'tainly apply to unmanned spa_ flight
programs and certain aeronautical R&D programs as well. The qualitative prioritization
of mishaps, which are only identified by Fault Tree Analysis (FTAs) and Event Tree
Analysis (ETAs), is a good first step in focusing on what could possibly be the most
significant possible risks, However, where the risk level may be significant, a more
quantitative risk assessment methodology may be required such as that used to
determine the possibility and severi.ty of failures during missions using nuclear power
devices such as RTGs (radioisotope thermoelectric generators/Galileo and Ulysses
missions). This has many other names such as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and
others. If used judiciously it can show relative values of risks (not absolute) and support
effective use of program and project resources.
Some other points that can be made include the following:
The safety process, including system safety, must be a part of the original program
requirements so that the old saw of "Reliability should be designed into the hardware
and software, not tried to be inspected into it." This also applies to safety and, to some
degree, the quality control aspects of design and manufacturing. To use a current term
that is receiving a great deal of attention, this means Total Q_ality Management (TOM),
or any of another half-dozen terms meaning the same thing.
the:D_i_ffe_:im::_eii_i_ This stems from the "Not To Worry" attitude m
which the manager and the engineers say to themselves: "The reliability and quality
assurance guys down the line will catch any problems, so why worryl"
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3. Although this is placed under safety and reliability, it really applies across
the board to everyone connected _th an aersspace progr_...engineers, technicians,
middle and higher management _e f_:: '__tl_ff _:'='::_::'f_:;i__di_:_:_:__:'__":_
cOmpany,:or at: any: __nt !agencyi
Engineer: "Why don't I get any respect from my managers?"
Supervisor: "Partly because of the way you dress. They often rely solely
on shallow, initial first impressions! It's true! Most
managers and executives rarely take the effort to delve
beneath surface features."
Engineer: "But that's absurd. It is like saying they read reports just by
glancing at the title page!"
Supervisor: "Hey, I've got some bad news about that as well ..... "
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::':y::.::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ==================================
__:.i:_:ii_i:.l'a_ The Skylab launched on May 14, 1973, had suffered a
complete loss of the meteoroid shield around the orbital workshop. This was followed
by the loss of one of the two solar array systems on the workshop and a failure of the
interstage adapter to separate from the S-II stage of the Saturn V vehicle. The
investigation identified the most probable cause of this flight anomaly to be the breakup
and loss of the meteoroid shield due to aerodynamic loads that were not accounted for
in its design. The Skylab report noted: The venting analysis for the auxiliary tunnel was
predicated on a completely sealed aft end; the openings in the tunnel thus resulted from
a failure of communications among aerodynamics, structural design, and manufacturing
personnel. The failure to recognize the design deficiencies of the meteoroid shield
through six years of analysis, design, and test was due, in part, to a presumption that the
shield would be "tight to the tank" and "structurally integral with the s-rVB tank" as set
forth in the design criteria. In practice, the meteoroid shield, as a large, flexible, limp
system that proved difficult to rig to the tank and to obtain the close fit that was
presumed by the design. These design deficiencies of the meteoroid shield as well as
the failure to communicate within the project the critical nature of its proper venting.
must therefore be attributed to an absence of sound engineering judgement and alert
engineering leadership concerning this particular system over a considerable period of
time?
In its 1963 revort, the Air Force singled out the following as Program and
Contract Functions that needed attention:
department conventions, top management did not take action to ensure that internal
policies, procedures, authority, and responsibilities were clearly defined for integrated
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program control. To alleviate the concerns, it was recommended that clear-cut
management interfaces be established between the government and their contractors
with well-defined reporting procedures.
2.
Delays in definitizing letter contracts result in creation of work forces
without positive direction, handicap progress evaluation, stimulation of continued
program redirection, and expenditure of funds on tasks that do not contribute fully to
the achievement of program objectives. Two points were made here: (1) program
definition activities should keep two or more competitors active until defin/tive contract
is singed with one; and (2) emphasize alternatives to letter contracts and definization
milestones when letter contracts are unavoidable.
.:::..._:.,: • .::::::::.::::_.+ ' +,::_:::: ... ?:._::::::_:::: : "+ :.:::., ======================'_ +._:.. :::::::_ :.......::_::_, ======================-3.
Make-or-buy decisions were not made or evaluated in accordance with
government policy or intent, thereby perm/tting poor utilization of industrial resources,
contributing tO late deliveries, poor performance, and increased costs. The action
recommended was to have more fixed-price and incentive contracts that obviate.
government concern with contractor's make-or,buy decisiohs (unless use of a
government-owned facility is involved). . •
_a'_r/_pt_re_entsa_ _ifi_?:_li_ii::_?_Ids_ This "Master Buy Plan System"
•provides visibilify into major procurements and allows Headquarters' review of key
procurement documents to endure the quality of individual procurements as well as to
identify trends that may require adjustments to theprocurement system.
_t_:i+ia_b_i+'__i!:+f+_ Included is a system for regular follow-up to ensure timely
accomplishment of the recommendations included in the survey reports.
There are many others, but this appears as a typical l/st.
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"SUMMARY'
This is obviously a br/ef, very brief, look into the lessons learned world. The
purpose was to stir up your thinking, not with regard to the specific items noted here,
but how to implement those lessons you have learned and will be learning to the next
generation of aerospace programs. As we all know, what good is an education if we
don't put it to some constructive use, and that applies to lessons learned.
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FIGUI_ 3C
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